This study uses a lab experiment to examine the relation between income inequality and individual redistribution choices. The median voter theorem suggests that support for redistribution should increase when inequality increases. However, empirically this is not always the case. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the relation between inequality and redistribution preferences differs depending on how income is assigned. Specifically, we find that increases in effort-based income inequality lead to lower redistribution rates while increases in random income inequality lead to higher redistribution rates. These findings support a model where preferences for redistribution depend upon work earnings as a signal of deservingness.
Introduction
Redistribution choices and the political economy of redistribution have long puzzled economists. In particular, economists have found mixed results regarding the relation between the degree of inequality in work earnings and the redistribution preferences of individuals. Many theoretical studies draw on the median voter theorem to predict that redistribution from the rich to the poor should increase as inequality increases (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) 1 . However, contrary to the theoretical prediction, much of the empirical literature on redistribution choices finds support for the opposite effect. Notably, it is well-documented that most European countries engage in substantially more income redistribution than does the US, despite lower pre-tax income inequality levels in Europe (Bertola and Ichino, 1995; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Guvenen, Kuruscu and Ozkan, 2013) . Research on individual preferences within the US public sector also finds that public sector employees display greater preferences for redistribution (Blais, Blake and Dion, 1990 ) despite having lower levels of inequality in their earnings (Gregory and Borland, 1999) . Several reasons for this inverse relationship between inequality and redistribution have been offered. For example, some point to differences in governance structure and belief systems between European countries and the US as reasons for the difference in support for redistribution; we explore an alternative explanation in this paper. Specifically, we explore how redistribution choices are influenced by whether the earnings inequality stems from differences in effort compared to differences in luck. In other words, we consider whether individuals perceive work earnings as a proxy for deservingness that provides information about the added value of effort. In particular, we hypothesize that an increase in inequality based on work earnings should result in a smaller change in support for redistribution than an increase in inequality based on luck. The mechanism justifying this hypothesis is that the inequality of work earnings influences the perceptions of deservingness directly, by providing cues about the added value of effort.
Our mechanism relies on two assumptions. First, we assume that, when income is earned, fairness perceptions regarding income distribution depend on the effort and value added by income earners. For example, if two individuals perform the same activity equally well, but one of them works for twice as long as the other and is paid twice as much, this difference in earnings is likely perceived as fair due to the extra effort. In addition to effort, fairness is perceived according to the value added by an individual. For example, one may assume that a CEO of a company would provide more value in one hour of work than a company manager. In each case, the income distribution is perceived as more justified if it is the result of heterogeneity in effort and added value.
Our second assumption is that individuals use heuristic cues from a payoff distribution to infer the value of effort. If effort and added value can be observed and compared to reference groups, fairness judgments, and particularly attitudes towards the redistribution of income, can be drawn from such observations. However, it is often difficult to observe and quantitatively compare skill and performance. While most would agree that the CEO in the above example should receive more than the company manager, the value of effort is difficult to quantify. Whether a CEO from a large company should be paid $1,000 or $10,000 per hour is hard to assess. As a result, individuals may resort to simplifying cues or signals to assess the fairness of compensation. (Simon, 1955; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Charness and Levin, 2005; Charness, Karni and Levin, 2007; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010) . In this study, we propose that individuals use heuristic rules related to the observed earned income distribution to develop the deservingness perceptions they then use to guide their redistribution choices. In particular, we assume that, as payoffs become more unequal, individuals perceive income differences as more justified, even if these differences are not truly driven by extra added value.
This use of payoffs as a cue to infer added-value is similar to the use of market prices to infer information about the economy. For example, prices have been shown to reveal information about the quality of a good or service, the fundamental value of stock prices, and the aggregate economy (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2010) , Angeletos and Panousi (2011) ). Similarly, in our context, individuals may use payoff differences as heuristic cues for underlying deservingness if they believe the payoffs reflect the underlying deservingness, even when the payoffs are not endogenously determined.
Under these assumptions, redistribution preferences depend on fairness perceptions, which are a function of the degree of inequality in earned income. If so, then we should see a stronger effect of our mechanism in cases where individuals are more likely to believe compensation to be meritocratic and a function of effort as well as its added value. This is consistent with previous research that finds that individuals are more likely to perceive status inequalities as justified when meritocracy is primed (McCoy and Major, 2007 ). An increase in compensation inequality may lead to a similar priming effect, by leading individuals to infer that performance inequality has increased. This outcome should hold even if the increase in compensation inequality is exogenously assigned.
Regarding the effect of inequality in work earnings on redistribution preferences, we consider several possibilities. First, if individuals assign higher deservingness to those with higher income, then an increase in income inequality should lead to less support for redistribution. On the other hand, both Meltzer and Richard (1981) and prior experimental evidence (e.g., Agranov and Palfrey (2014) ) suggest that greater income inequality is related to higher support for redistribution. Furthermore, several previous studies suggest that an individuals redistribution choices are influenced by an individual's own income as well as actual task performance (e.g. Rutström and Williams (2000) , Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden (2007) , Krawczyk (2010) , Rey-Biel, Sheremeta and Uler (2011) ). Disentangling these factors is challenging and, thus, using observational data to assess the impact of inequality of work earnings on redistribution preferences is difficult.
In order to isolate the effect of compensation inequality on deservingness perceptions, we use a lab experiment where we compare redistribution choices based on whether payoffs result from real effort or pure luck. Our experimental framework is meant to disentangle the effect of compensation inequality on deservingness perceptions from the effect of compensation inequality on redistribution choices attributable to self-interest and preferences for equality. The design includes four treatments: (1) Performance-Low-Inequality, (2) Performance-High-Inequality, (3) Luck-Low-Inequality and (4) Luck-High-Inequality. In the first two treatments, pre-redistribution payoffs result from the performance of participants in a real-effort task, while in treatments (3) and (4), pre-redistribution payoffs are assigned randomly. In all treatments, the pre-redistribution payoffs are divided into three categories: bottom, middle, and top. Furthermore, in treatments (1) and (2), the performance thresholds determining participants pre-redistribution payoffs are absolute and do not change between treatments. In all treatments, after pre-redistribution payoffs are allocated, participants are asked to vote on how much to redistribute from top to bottom tier participants. The largest redistribution rate receiving majority support is implemented.
The difference between redistribution choices in treatments (1) and (2) shows how redistribution choices are influenced by task-related payoff dispersion. However, differences in redistributive choices between treatments (1) and (2) may simply result from their different payoff inequality. To assess whether the payoff inequality resulting from the task has a different impact than the payoff inequality resulting from randomness, we compare the differences in redistribution choices between our Performance treatments (1) and (2) and our Luck treatments (3) and (4). In doing so, we are able to test our hypothesis that participants perceive payoff inequality resulting from a task as fairer than payoff inequality driven by luck, even when the differences in payoff inequality are exogenously assigned by the experimenter.
Our main empirical result shows support for our hypothesis. Specifically, we find a negative difference-in-differences estimator in the redistribution rates between our Performance (1) and (2) and Luck (3) and (4) treatments. The redistribution rate in the Performance treatments decreases as inequality increases, while the redistribution rate in the Luck treatments increases as inequality increases. Additionally, we find that this result varies with participant pre-redistribution payoffs: the difference-in-differences estimator is negative and significant for those in the bottom tier, negative and significant, though smaller, for those in the middle tier, and positive but insignificant for those in the top tier.
These findings contribute to the literature on fairness perceptions and social behavior, e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) , Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) , Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) , Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007) Ku and Salmon (2013) ; Balafoutas, Kocher, Putterman and Sutter (2013) . This stream of research uses variants of standard experiments to examine how pro-social behavior changes when payoffs are earned as a function of the outcome of a task versus through luck. Specifically, this research finds that participants who earn their payoffs or choice rights through performance are less generous in their behavior. In contrast to these studies, we do not find that redistribution is always lower under the Performance treatments (Ruffle, 1998; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Balafoutas et al., 2013; Durante, Putterman and Weele, 2014) , but that redistribution behavior is impacted by the level of inequality within the Luck versus Performance treatments. Thus, our findings lend greater insight into the relation between payoff inequality and pro-social behavior.
Our study also builds upon Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2014) . In their study, the level of inequality is endogenously driven by individual task performance, whereas in our study we exogenously manipulate the level of ex-ante inequality. Since we exogenously force inequality to vary while the performance of any given bottom, middle, or top participant is unchanged, we are able to measure the causal effect of changes in payoff inequality from a task on redistribution choices. We believe our results complement their finding that changes in inequality resulting from luck result in a stronger preference for redistribution.
As far as we are aware, ours is the first paper exploring the relation between inequality in earned income and redistribution choices while controlling for both how income is generated and the extent of payoff inequality. Our proposed mechanism relies on the payoff distribution providing informational cues regarding the fairness of compensation and that these cues impact redistribution choices. We control for both inequality and effort, and manipulate pre-redistribution inequality in order to isolate the effect of inequality in work earnings on redistribution choices. Doing so, we find that redistribution choices are affected differently by changes in inequality depending on whether the inequality is task-or luck-based, even if the degree of inequality is exogenously determined in both cases. Our results show that an increase in inequality results in a smaller change in support for redistribution when income is earned through an activity than when income is assigned by luck. This insight provides an alternative explanation for why individuals in the US are less favorable to redistribution than those in other developed countries despite a significant increase in US income inequality in the last 30 years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our model and its predictions; Section 3 provides a detailed description of our experimental design and of the motivation for our design choices; in Section 4, we provide and discuss the descriptive statistics of our sample; Section 5 presents the results of the regression analysis; finally, Section 6 concludes.
Model & Predictions
In this section, we first introduce a simple model to illustrate our core mechanism and then use this model to derive our main hypothesis. To develop our model, we begin by identifying an economy with three individuals with different incomes y: bottom, middle and top, such that 0<y b <y m <y t . In this economy, individuals vote on their preferred redistribution rate, r, to be paid by the individual with the top income to the individual with the bottom income (note that, in this economy, the middle individual experiences no change in income as a result of redistribution). For simplicity, we assume that individual utility functions follow a Cobb-Douglas structure, where individuals care for the utility of other individuals proportionally to how deserving they judge the other individuals to be. Finally, assuming self-interest motivations, we expect that individuals will favor receiving more income than what they would judge others with the same performance to deserve. We express the utility function of each individual as follows:
where d i is the deservingness of individual i and s, which is assumed to be bigger than 1, reflects an individuals self-interest. We can now find the optimal redistribution choice for each individual by maximizing these utility functions, obtaining r * b , r * m , and r * t (available in the Appendix).
So far, the model does not constrain how individuals judge other individuals deservingness (i.e., d i ). In order to capture our main mechanism, we assume that deservingness is a linearly increasing function of how much income an individual earns from a task.
Note that the constant a, which is assumed to be positive, measures the degree to which individuals are perceived to be equally deserving; that is, the higher a is, the greater the perception that individuals are equally deserving, regardless of performance. If individuals make inferences regarding performance from income earned, we can assume that performance and, by extension, deservingness assessments derive from performance-based income levels. Conversely, luck-based income levels should not drive deservingness assessments. We next suppose that the respective incomes of the bottom, b, and top, t, individuals are equally distant from the middle individuals income, m: y b = y − I, y m = y, and y t = y + I, where I represents the degree of income inequality. To assess whether an increase in inequality affects redistribution choices differently when pre-redistribution income is determined by performance rather than luck, we compare the derivatives of our individual optimal redistribution choices with respect to inequality (I) when each individuals income is earned through effort and when it is determined by luck. Doing so, we find that the increase in redistribution from an increase in inequality when income is earned through effort is always smaller than that when income is determined by luck (see the Appendix for the optimal choices under these assumptions and the derivative differences, by individual income tier). Thus, this model supports our hypothesis. The next section describes the experimental design we implement to test this hypothesis.
Experiment
To test our hypothesis, we conducted a lab experiment with students at Tufts University between April and September 2014. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes and involved between 9 and 18 participants. Each participant took part in only one treatment. We ran 17 sessions with 219 students in total. Average earnings were about $13, including a show-up fee of $5.
To test whether inequality of work income affects redistribution choices differently than inequality resulting from luck, our design accounts for other factors that have been documented to impact redistribution preferences, such as an individual's own income (Rutström and Williams (2000) ), the effort required to obtain the income (Krawczyk, 2010; Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis, 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2013) , and the overall level of in-come inequality (Agranov and Palfrey, 2014) . To that end, we use four treatments: (1) Performance-Low-Inequality, (2) Performance-High-Inequality, (3) Luck-Low-Inequality and (4) Luck-High-Inequality. While each session consists of four rounds, we concentrate on rounds 1 and 2 as these are the rounds designed to test our hypothesis. We will explore rounds 3 and 4 in future work related to other hypotheses. Prior to each round, participants receive instructions specific to that round. The experimental instructions and screenshots for all four rounds are provided in the online Appendix.
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In each session, participants are informed that they are randomly and anonymously assigned to a group of three individuals and that their group will change for each round. Each round consists of two stages: an earnings stage and a redistribution choice stage, as described in the following subsections.
Performance Treatments
Stage 1: Real-effort task
In the first stage, participants perform a real-effort task that consists of moving 48 sliders across a computer screen to the center of a bar (Gill and Prowse, 2011) . Participants have 120 seconds to move as many sliders as they can. After performing the task, participants are assigned to the bottom, middle, or top payoff tier based on the number of sliders successfully moved. Participants are informed of the tier thresholds prior to performing the task.
In our performance treatments, the low-and high-inequality treatments differ in their first stage payoffs. Table 1 presents the first stage payoffs for the two treatments as a function of the number of sliders successfully moved. Notes: There were a total of 48 sliders to complete in 120 seconds.
Although the bottom, middle, and top thresholds are the same in the two Performance treatments, these treatments differ in payoff inequality.
3 As shown in Table 1 , a participant who successfully positions up to 13 sliders receives $6 in the Performance-Low-Inequality treatment but $0 in the Performance-High-Inequality treatment. A participant who positions 14 to 17 sliders receives $9 in both treatments. A participant who positions 18 sliders or more receives $12 in the Performance-Low-Inequality treatment and $18 in the PerformanceHigh-Inequality treatment. These payoffs mean that an increase from 13 to 14 sliders results in a $3 increase in the low-inequality treatment and a $6 increase in the high-inequality treatment.
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We use absolute thresholds in determining pre-redistribution payoffs to ensure that competition or other strategic motivations during stage 1 do not affect participant task effort or redistribution choices. We also select a task that minimizes the impact of ability to ensure that effort is the main driver of task outcomes. Furthermore, the effort required to reach the middle and top thresholds is identical in the high-and low-inequality treatments. Thus, we assign the difference in inequality between the treatments exogenously, rather than having the inequality be determined by effort. Stage 1 concludes when participants are informed of their payoff from performing the task.
Stage 2: Redistribution choice
In the second stage, participants select the maximum rate (0% to 100% in increments of 10 percentage points) at which the payoff should be redistributed from top-to bottom-tier participants. To ensure that participants understand the activity, they are shown examples (available in the online Appendix) and complete a comprehension quiz. They are also informed that the maximum redistribution rate chosen by the median individual in their group will be implemented.
To illustrate the stage 2 decision process, we consider an example. If participants choose the redistribution rates presented in Example 1 of Table 2 , the implemented redistribution rate would be 50% (the median redistribution rate chosen). As a result, all participants would earn $9 in this round because $9 would be transferred from the top to bottom participant. The payoff for the middle participant does not change. Note: The implemented redistribution rate is the maximum rate supported by two out of the three participants in a treatment, which for this group would be 50%. That means that 50% of the "Top" payoff ($9) will be given to "Bottom" payoff participant(s).
Next, we consider the example where there is one top participant and two bottom participants. In this case, 50% of the top participants payoff would be equally distributed to the two bottom participants. Conversely, if there are two top participants and one bottom participant, then 50% of each top participants income would be redistributed to the bottom participant. Finally, if there are only middle participants, then no redistribution would take place. In our experiment, participants were informed about all possible scenarios before making their redistribution decisions.
In our experiment, participants know their stage 1 payoff tier when they make their redistribution choices. However, they do not know the payoff tier of the other participants. This stipulation ensures that voting choices do not depend on the specific outcomes of the group payoffs. It also ensures that redistribution choices reported in groups whose makeup precludes redistribution are not cheap talk. Stage 2 concludes when participants make their choices and are informed of their earnings. Previous studies have shown that redistribution may affect performance on tasks (Agranov and Palfrey (2014) ). To assess whether this is the case in our design, we conduct two rounds in our experiment: round 1 where participants do not know that they will be asked to make a redistribution choice and round 2 where they are aware of the redistribution task. This difference in knowledge between rounds 1 and 2 allows us to check whether participants perform differently when they know that payoffs will be redistributed. As we will show in the next sections, a comparison of the results in rounds 1 and 2 shows no evidence of moral hazard.
To examine the impact of payoff inequality on redistribution choices, we conduct a regression analysis with redistribution choices as the primary dependent variable. The difference between redistribution choices under the two Performance treatments allows us to assess the effect of an increase in the dispersion of payoffs obtained from performance on redistribution. However, to assess whether the effect of an increase in the inequality resulting from a real-effort activity on redistribution choices is different from the effect of pure inequality, we run two additional treatment conditions in our experiment, which we describe in the next subsection.
Luck Treatments
In addition to the two Performance treatments, we conduct two Luck treatments where pre-redistribution payoffs are randomly assigned with equal probability.
5 Similar to the Performance-High-Inequality treatment, possible pre-redistribution payoffs for the LuckHigh-Inequality treatment are $0, $9, and $18. Similar to the Performance-Low-Inequality treatment, possible pre-redistribution payoffs for the Luck-Low-Inequality treatment are $6, $9, and $12. The Luck treatments allow us to assess the impact of the level of inequality on redistribution choices. That is, by comparing redistribution choices under the Luck-High-Inequality treatment and the Luck-Low-Inequality treatment, we can identify the impact of pure payoff inequality on redistribution choices. Taken together, the Performance and the Luck treatments allow us to compare the impact of effort-based inequality and luck-based inequality on redistribution choices.
Descriptive Statistics
In total, our experiments involve 219 individuals across 17 experimental sessions: 69 participants in the Performance-Low-Inequality treatment, 54 in the Performance-High-Inequality treatment, 57 in the Luck-Low-Inequality treatment, and 39 in in the Luck-High-Inequality treatment. Note that we have an uneven number of participants in each treatment because we want to ensure we have at least 15 participants of each type in each treatment in each round. 5 Since payoffs are randomly assigned, we do not have participants in the Luck treatments perform a task, as this may generate feelings of unfairness. For example, a participant may feel unfairly treated if she performs the task well but is randomly assigned a low payoff.
6 Although our intent was to obtain equal numbers of bottom, medium, and top placements, through random chance, we ended up with a relatively high number of bottom types in the early sessions of our Table 3 presents the averages and standard deviations of the outcome variables of our experiment: the redistribution rate chosen, the performance of participants (number of sliders), the proportion of bottom, middle, and top participants, and the pre-redistribution payoffs.
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Treatment statistics are separated into four panels and broken down by treatment round.
The statistics in Table 3 show that participants in the high (low)-inequality treatment complete an average of 14.69 (13.49) sliders. This difference across treatments may reflect greater incentives in the high-inequality group, although the difference is not significant. The statistics also show that task performance is higher in round 2, although again the difference is not significant. Overall, we conclude that redistribution knowledge does not impact task performance and thus there is no evidence of moral hazard. Finally, the statistics show that Performance treatment participants choose a higher redistribution rate than do the Luck treatment participants, particularly in the low-inequality conditions. This result may seem counter-intuitive. However, these statistics reflect not just the amount redistributed to others, but the amount redistributed to oneself for participants in the bottom tier. Thus, it is unsurprising that bottom tier participants would feel entitled to a bigger payoff when they had to exert effort to obtain their payoff than when no effort was required. Interestingly, it is less clear why middle tier participants in the Performance treatment are more likely to redistribute more to the bottom tier; this result may reflect an underlying perception that bottom tier participants deserve some extra allocation due to effort. While top tier participants in the Performance treatment are also more likely to redistribute more to the bottom tier, the difference for top tier participants in the Performance and Luck treatments is not significant (see Table 4 in the next section). In the next section, we present the results of our multivariate regressions on the reallocation choices under the four treatment conditions.
Luck-Low-Inequality treatments. To mitigate this issue, we ran extra sessions of this treatment to ensure we had enough participants of each type. Since participants did not know their group composition, the uneven number of participants across payoff tiers should not impact our results. In the Appendix, we provide a table of demographics by treatment as well as by bottom, middle, and top pre-redistribution payoffs in rounds 1 and 2.
7 Average payoffs are the same pre-and post-redistribution. 8 In the Appendix, we show the full distribution of effort in the Performance treatments by round. The distributions are quite similar. 
Regression Analysis
In this section, we discuss the results of our regressions to assess the role of the incentive structure in the redistribution choices of participants. To begin, we let r it be the maximum redistribution rate supported by individual i in round t. In analyzing the drivers of the redistribution choices of the participants of our experiment, we consider the following functional form:
r it = c+α p * P erf orm it +α H * High it +β * P erf orm it * High it +α R Round t +γ b δ
Bottom it
In this reduced-form model, we include dummies for the following variables: performance treatment (P erf orm it ), high-inequality treatment (High it ), Performance-High-Inequality treatment (P erf orm it *High it ), round 2 (α R ), and top and bottom pre-redistribution payoffs (δ Bottom it and δ T op it ). We also include a set of control variable dummies, X i , comprised of Male, US Citizen, White ethnicity, Economics Major, Volunteer, and Donor.
We test the hypothesis that an increase in the inequality of earnings from work results in less additional support for redistribution than an increase in inequality resulting from luck, using the coefficient β. As discussed, our model predicts that the difference between the change in expected redistribution rates when inequality increases in the Performance treatments (E[r p,H ]−E[r p,L ]) and the change in expected redistribution rates when inequality increases in the Luck treatments (E[r l,H ] − E[r l,L ]) should be negative 9 This difference-indifferences is captured by β: Looking at Table 4 , we see that the results in column 1 show that the estimate of β is -15 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 5% level for a one-sided test.
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This result corroborates our hypothesis that support for redistribution increases less with inequality when payoffs are due to pure performance than when payoffs are due to luck. Specifically, we find that participants in the Performance-High-Inequality treatment choose smaller redistribution rates than participants in the Performance-Low-Inequality treatment, while participants in the Luck-High-Inequality treatment choose higher redistribution rates than participants in the Luck-Low-Inequality treatment. This happens even though the payoff thresholds are the same and average performance is similar in the High and LowInequality treatments. As discussed in previous sections, a possible explanation for this finding is that, when payoffs are associated with performance, participants associate an increase in payoff with higher deservingness. Also, we find that top-payoff participants choose much smaller redistribution rates than do middle-payoff participants (the omitted category in columns 2 and 3), while bottompayoff participants choose much higher redistribution rates. These results are not surprising, as top-payoff participants lose money while bottom-payoff participants benefit from higher redistribution rates.
Finally, the results in Table 4 show that redistribution rates do not vary significantly between rounds 1 and 2. Likewise, our control variables yield no significant differences, with the exception of our volunteer and donor dummies. These latter results are in line with previous studies that find that participants who donate or volunteer choose to give more to public goods than do other participants (de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson, 2012) .
Regressions Divided by the Pre-Redistribution Payoffs
In our final set of regressions, we examine the redistribution choices of participants within different pre-redistribution payoff tiers. Table 5 shows the results of our regressions with the same dependent and explanatory variables as the regression in column 3 of Table 4 , but with only bottom, middle, and top tier participants, respectively. Observations are pooled for rounds 1 and 2.
The results in Table 5 show a difference-in-differences estimator of -30.62 percentage points for the bottom tier sample, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The source of the difference-in-differences for this group is similar to that for the regression including all participants. Specifically, the bottom tier participants choose to redistribute more when payoff inequality increases in the Luck treatments but choose to redistribute less when payoff inequality increases in the Performance treatments. Again, this result is consistent with our hypothesis. This result suggests that bottom tier participants believe they deserve less of a share of the top tier performance-based payoff when inequality is higher, even though the extent of the inequality is exogenously determined. However, when payoffs are determined by luck, they believe that they deserve a greater share when inequality is higher. We also conclude that this difference-in-differences cannot be explained by self-interest, as bottom tier participants have the same potential gain across the Performance and Luck treatments.
Examining the results for our middle tier sample, we find that middle participants choose less redistribution under high inequality than under low inequality in the Performance treatments and more redistribution under high inequality in the Luck treatments. These results show that the difference-in-differences for the middle-payoff participants is consistent with our hypothesis but smaller in magnitude than the difference in differences for the bottompayoff participants. Finally, the results for our top tier participants show an overall lower average redistribution rate. The difference-in-differences is much noisier for this group and not significant.
Conclusion
In this study, we explore how redistribution choices are influenced by the level of income inequality when the income is earned versus assigned randomly. If redistribution choices reflect perceptions of deservingness, then we hypothesize that an increase in performance-based income inequality should have a smaller effect on redistribution support than an increase in luck-based income inequality. This hypothesis is motivated by two assumptions: first, when income is based on work, the perceived fairness of the income distribution is a function of the added value of effort; second, individuals obtain information about the unobservable deservingness of others through observable income. To further motivate our hypothesis, we propose a model where individuals rely on information provided by the income distribution to infer the deservingness of others. We test our hypothesis by estimating the difference-in-differences in redistribution rates after performance-versus luck-based inequality increases and find support for our hypothesis. Specifically, as the extent of inequality increases, redistribution rates increase in the Luck treatments and decrease in the Performance treatments. Examining the results within our three payoff tier subsamples, we find that this statistic is negative and significant for our bottom and middle tier participants, but not significant for our top tier participants.
Our findings contribute to the redistribution literature by highlighting how income inequality levels and income earning methods interact to impact redistribution choices. These findings suggest an alternative explanation for why income is more likely to be perceived as driven by effort and performance in the US versus Europe, or in the private versus public sector. This explanation suggests that individuals use observed income as a heuristic for unobservable deservingness. As a consequence, support for redistribution decreases when performance-based income inequality increases. Our findings reflect how the source of income inequality impacts redistribution choices in a laboratory setting. An important next step would be to test if our results hold in a field setting. In addition, we find that there is less support for redistribution as inequality rises when income is earned through effort rather than through luck. However, in the real world, individuals can select geographic locations as well as occupation areas that differ in the extent of redistribution and inequality. Consequently, another important area for future research is discovering how much of the empirically observed differences in support for redistribution are driven by such selections, on top of the mechanism that we have highlighted in this paper. . Panel (a) illustrates the Effort, as measured by number of sliders completed, in round 1 is very similar to the Effort in round 2 for all pre-redistribution types ("bottom", "middle" and "top"). Panel (b) illustrates the reallocation rate by round for the three pre-redistribution types (bottom, middle, and top.
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